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STUART CHESSMANt
I. Introduction
The relationship between customary international law and prior
treaties-specifically whether treaties enjoy any intrinsic superiority over
custom as a source of international law or vice versa-has attracted little
notice before international tribunals and in international legal scholarship.
Only a few decisions have indirectly discussed this question, and most legal
scholars have confined themselves to laconic and unsupported assertions
This dearth of authority exists because until well into this century, custom-
ary international law was largely a set of fixed, immemorial rules. Multi-
lateral treaties provided the basic means for further creative development of
international law. Whether a new customary rule might supersede a prior
treaty was at most an academic question unlikely to arise under the circum-
stances prevailing at that time.
The state of affairs has changed drastically Theories have arisen which
.This comment is a revision of a paper presented to the Ad Hoc Committee on the ALI
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section of International Law
and Practice of the American Bar Association, on July 27, 1981.
tMember of Ohio bar and member, Ad Hoc Committee on the ALI Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Section of International Law and
Practice of the American Bar Association.
'See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.2See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. "An examination of the literature does not
create the impression that the subject of hierarchy did much to disturb the peace of mind of
writers." Bos, The Hierarchy among the Recognized Manifestations (Sources) of International
Law, in 1 ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL: HOMENAJE AL PROFESSOR MIAJA DE LA MUELA,
363, 368 (Madrid 1979).3Professor Bos emphasizes the new significance of the source hierarchy in the light of recent
developments in international organizations and jus cogens. Bos, supra note 2, at 374.
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make new customary international law far easier to create! Moreover, an
expanded concept of customary law may serve as a vehicle for special
interest groups to establish new international law based on assertions con-
tained in treaties between limited numbers of states or made before interna-
tional organizations, or even to avoid treaty obligations.
The changing scope of customary international law in legal theory is, of
course, of great concern to the United States. Any expansion or revision of
the authority of customary international law at the expense of treaty obliga-
tions-even if initially only in theory-must be viewed critically in the light
of possible consequences for United States foreign relations. Moreover, it is
arguable that United States courts may apply international law in deroga-
tion of prior domestic law.' The application of customary norms to many
sensitive domestic issues may result since the scope of international law itself
has expanded far beyond the regulation of relations between states to areas
such as human rights and economic codes of conduct
The leading authority for the interpretation of international law in the
courts of this country is the Restatement of the Law (Second); Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1965) (the "Restatement 2d") published
by the American Law Institute (ALI).' In applying international law, a
United States court often looks to the Restatement 2d as the best authority.
In recent years the ALI has undertaken to revise the Restatement 2d in light
of the many substantive developments since its publication The final draft
4A well-known example is the "instant law" theory of Bin Cheng. See Cheng, United Nations
Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law? in CHENG, ed.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE, 237, 260 (London 1982).
5See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 221-224 (Mineola 1972) (unde-
cided whether courts would apply newly developed customary international law in disregard of
earlier statute, treaty, or executive action).
6L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
8-9 (St. Paul 1980); FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-71 (New
York 1966); Fenwick, International Law: The Old and the New, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 481-83
(1966).7The American Law Institute is a self-selected group of approximately 1,800 eminent
American practitioners, jurists and scholars. The ALI's principal function is the production and
adoption of RESTATEMENTS on various legal areas. Many of the Restatements are regularly used
by courts to guide them. In the area of international law, the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States has been particularly influential since many judges-whose focus has
been primarily domestic law-have little experience or training in this subject. Courts and
policymakers of other countries have also relied on the Restatement 2d for explications of the
U.S. position on international law topics. "The previous Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States [Restatement 2d] was developed during 1955-62, adopted by the
Institute in 1962, and finally promulgated, with revisions, in 1965." See "Introduction to the
Revised Restatement" in ALI, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised), Council Draft No. 5, at intro. 1 (September 14, 1983). The drafts are generally
obtainable in most law libraries. Despite its designation and citation, the Restatement 2d is in
fact the first and only restatement of foreign relations law.
8See id. The revision process commenced in 1980. Reporters for the project are the draftsmen
of the various Council drafts, and are assisted by a group of advisors. The Chief Reporter for the
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of this Restatement (revised), therefore, will be regarded not as an
academic treatise but as a primary source of international law. The opinions
adopted by the Restatement Reporters will have such broad authority in
practice that before any new legal ground is broken, the reporters should
give full consideration to the political and legal consequences of the new
Restatement.
On April 1, 1980, the AL published Parts I and III of Tentative Draft No.
1, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
(the "Draft Restatement"). The Draft Restatement's black-letter rules and
its accompanying comments and explanatory notes9 contain statements
regarding new customary international law and its authority over prior
treaty obligations which diverge from the position taken in the past by the
ALI and by the United States. This Comment describes the Draft Restate-
ment's position, examines what support it finds in international law and
scholarship, and shows that, at the present state of development of interna-
tional law, cogent reasons argue against its adoption.
II. The Draft Restatement Position
A. SECTION 102
Section 102 of the Draft Restatement defines the sources of international
law:
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the
international political system
a. in the form of customary law;
b. by international agreement; or
c. by derivation from general principles of law common to the major legal
systems of the world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
This Section is new to the Draft Restatement. The Restatement 2d did not
discuss the sources of international law.
Section 102 does not openly rank the sources listed. Custom is, however,
listed first-a departure from the traditional order of sources in Article 38(1)
revision is Louis Henkin; the Associate Reporters are Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Louis B. Sohn
and Detlev F. Vagts. These drafts have been appearing since 1981 and are discussed and voted
on by the ALl membership at its annual meetings.
9The Draft Restatement is presented under three categories: black letter rules, comments
and Reporters' notes. As will be indicated, the interaction and hierarchy of these categories are
not always clear. Presumably, the rules are elucidated by the commentary, and the notes are
used by the Reporters to indicate trends, personal opinions, dissenting views, etc. There may be
a tendency by readers of the Draft Restatement and perhaps the Reporters themselves to merge
the three or at least to not distinguish the significance of information contained under a
particular category.
"
0Draft Restatement No. I at 24.
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of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute)." This
ordering is particularly significant because Note 1 to Section 102 states that
the Section "draws on" Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. Moreover, Com-
ment j to Section 102 states:
Customary law and law made by international agreement have equal authority as
international law .... [U]nless particular states have evinced a contrary intention,
a new rule of customary international law will supersede any inconsistent obliga-
tions created by earlier agreement."
Reporters' Note 4 to Section 102 seems to both narrow and expand
Comment j.3 In restricting it, Note 4 states that customary international law
and law made by international agreement have equal authority. This seems
to limit the amending force of subsequent customary international law
under Section 102 to international agreements which create general interna-
tional law, thus contradicting Comment j which allows new custom to
overrule "any inconsistent obligations created by earlier agreement." Note
4, in a different sense, broadens the scope of Section 102 by making explicit
that new customary international law may become binding on signatories to
a treaty through mere acquiescence.
To summarize, Section 102 departs from both the ICJ Statute and the
Restatement 2d in its treatment of customary international law. The com-
ments and notes to Section 102 evidence that the ALI endorses the position
that customary international law may terminate or modify a treaty.
B. SECTION 135
The position of Section 102 on customary international law is repeated
and reinforced by Section 135, dealing with conflicts between international
and domestic law. Once again, the treatment of conflicts between custom
and treaty is not clear from the Draft Restatement text itself. Section 135(1)
reads:
"Article 38 of the ICJ Statute reads:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as arc submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d .... , judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono, if the parties agree thereto.
"Draft Restatement No. 1 at 28.
31d., at 33.
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(1) A rule of international law or a provision of an agreement that becomes
effective as law in the United States supersedes any inconsistent law of the several
states of the United States, as well as any inconsistent pre-existing provision in the
law of the United States."
Comment b to Section 135, however, restates Section 102:
In international law, customary law is equal in authority to law made by interna-
tional agreement and in case of inconsistency between a rule of customary law and
a provision in an international agreement the latter prevails (unless otherwise
agreed). Section 102, Comment j. An international agreement of the United
States would supersede an earlier inconsistent rule of customary law of the United
States. By the same principle a rule of customary international law which de-
veloped after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier statute or international agree-
ment of the United States, should prevail as the law of the United States but that
has never been authoritatively determined."
Thus, Comment b carries Section 102 a step further by declaring that the
Section 102 position is itself a rule of international law. It does, however,
acknowledge there is no United States precedent for a custom superseding a
treaty. Note 1, however, to Section 135 is ambiguous, stating that subse-
quent custom should supersede prior treaty "in principle" (but apparently
not as a rule of international law), but admitting that this issue has never
arisen in this country and that the position of the Restatement 2d is not
unopposed 16
Section 135, therefore, only increases the uncertainty. It accepts that
customary international law may be applied by United States courts in
derogation not only of prior treaty obligations but also of domestic law,
without dealing with the difficult questions this disturbing possibility raises.
Ill. Customary International Law
Before discussing the consequences of the views adopted by the ALl in
the Draft Restatement, a brief discussion of contemporary customary inter-
national law is appropriate. Customary international law originally made up
all "general" international law-those international legal obligations bind-
ing upon all civilized states. The only other significant source of obligations
was treaties creating obligations for the signatories. Multilateral treaties
establishing rules of international law binding upon all states were at first




"Nevertheless it was recognized very early that treaties could also be a source of international
law. First, a multilateral treaty could make explicit declarations on international law, and if all
states adhered to that treaty, a rule of international law would result. Second, states not parties
to a treaty might act in accordance with the interpretation of international law that treaty
contained and thus consent to the creation of a rule of customary international law.
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means of developing new international law until the present day, even
though a reversal of this trend may now be occurring.8 The following
discussion necessarily only skims the surface of the developing customary
international law debate.
A. DEFINITION
The authoritative definition of customary international law is Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 9 which defines
"international custom" as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
This definition has admittedly caused confusion, because a "general practice
accepted as law" is evidence of the existence of a custom, i.e., of a rule of
customary international law, and not the other way around.' Still, the
definition makes clear that two elements are necessary to create customary
international law. First, there must be a practice, i.e., actions, statements or
inaction of one or more states. Second, the practice must be accepted as law.
This requirement is traditionally stated as opinio juris sive necessitatis,
usually defined as a conclusion or belief by the acting state that a certain
action is permitted, required or forbidden by international law.2'
As previously noted, custom was originally the exclusive source of inter-
national law, and its rules were viewed, rightly or wrongly, as established
from time immemorial. Only in this century has a variety of new customary
law been noticed or alleged, particularly in areas previously not governed by
international law because of prior technological impossibility (e.g., air
rights, continental shelf and sea bed mining rights) or because of more
restrictive past views on the scope of international law (e.g., human rights,
multinational corporate conduct). This new flowering of customary interna-
tional law in legal theory has confused what once were.sharp definitional
outlines. Today it is very difficult to determine what customary international
law is at any one moment since "[n]o definition of customary international
law has received universal agreement."22
1. Practice
The first element of customary international law is practice. Normally,
practice implies a succession or series of individual acts. Indeed, most
authorities require a series of acts to establish a practice; others, however,
"See Gamble, The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEX. INT'L L. REV. 305,
314-15, 319 (1981) (interpretation of new treaties will be fertile ground for growth of new
custom).
9Supra note 11. While the ICJ Statute is often used to indicate what are the sources of
international law, it is perhaps important to note that it is arguably binding only on the ICJ and
parties in cases before it.
"'WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, 26-28 (Breslau, 1964).
2
"Akehurst, Custom as a Source ofInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 31 (1974-75).22Draft Restatement, § 102 at 30.
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consider that under special circumstances only one act may suffice to estab-
lish a practice. 3 Nor is there consensus on whether a practice must be
continuous or how long a duration it must have had before it gives rise to a
customary rule. Some authorities maintain that interruptions are permitted,
and others assert that under appropriate circumstances a practice may give
rise to customary international law almost instantaneously 4
The nature of the practice necessary to establish customary international
law is also uncertain. It is unclear which acts of which representatives of a
state may contribute to a practice. Must the acts be those of the policy-
making representatives of the state or may acts of lower ranking officials or
even of private citizens be considered? It has been stated that all relevant
acts of all relevant parties may be considered in determining whether a
"practice" exists 5
Besides direct acts of states, there are arguably further sources of custom-
ary international law which might at first glance appear unlikely. For in-
stance, some authorities maintain that resolutions and acts of international
organizations may give rise to customary international law. Thus, these
authorities assert that if a state votes for a resolution declaring a rule of
customary international law, or fails to protest such a resolution, then a rule
of customary international law thereby arises binding upon that state and
possibly all others.26
2. Opinio Juris
The second element of a rule of customary international law is also subject
to confusion. Opiniojuris is usually defined as a belief or state of mind of the
acting state that it is legally compelled to follow the practice it contributes to.
This is obviously difficult to determine in dealing with the state of mind of an
abstract entity, such as a state. Therefore, most authorities look to official
statements which accompany acts of a state as best evidence of that state's
opinio juris.27 An example of a frequently encountered official statement is
the protest disputing another state's right to take an action and thus contest-
ing an alleged rule of customary international law.28 Some authori. ,es,
however, assert that no statements are necessary, but that only consent-
even by presumed acceptance through failure to protest-to another state's
action is necessary for opinio ]uris.z9 Some even deny that opinio juris is
necessary at all. At least in international legal scholarship, the evidence for
3WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 68; Akehurst, supra note 21, at 13-14.
'
4WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 67-69.
5WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 65-66; cf. Akehurst, supra note 21, at 53.26See the discussion under Draft Restatement § 102 at 31-33.27Akehurst, supra note 21, at 36-37.
'See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB No. 8865, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 302 (1973).
29WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 58.
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and nature of opinio juris is subject to no less controversy than the existence
of a practice.3"
Section 102 does not adequately address the problems outlined above. On
its face, its definition of international customary law seems to clarify and
restrict the definition of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. A practice must be "general" and "consistent," and opinio
juris is defined as the following of a practice by states "from a sense of legal
obligation." The comments and notes to Section 102, however, make clear
that this language is fully compatible with the broadest interpretations of
international customary law. Comment b to Section 102 states that a prac-
tice constituting international customary law may be of comparatively short
duration, "relatively consistent" and "general even if it is not universally
followed."'" Opinio juris may simply be inferred from practice.
In conclusion, the mere difficulty of determining the content of customary
international law must be taken into consideration in determining what
authority this law should have, especially in relation to fixed and relatively
clear treaty obligations. Customary international law may have been a
relatively stable code of rules; however, it is steadily becoming a broader
and more formless concept. Current thinking even raises the disturbing
possibility that even individual acts of subordinate officials may give rise to
rules of international law binding upon the officials of that state and all
others as well.32
IV. Treaty Obligations and Customary International Law
Under the Draft Restatement, a subsequent rule of customary interna-
tional law overrides prior treaty obligations. This is stated alternatively as
either a rule of customary international law itself or simply a "principle." 33 A
review of the sources of international law is necessary to determine what
acceptance the view of the Draft Restatement has gained in actual interna-
tional practice.
Professor Akehurst has outlined the three means used in domestic law to
resolve conflicts between laws. 4 First, a law later in time may prevail over an
3 See generally A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 66-72 (1971);
Scott and Carr, The International Court of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 347, 349-50 (1981).
31Draft Restatement No. 1 at 25.
32See D'Amato, supra note 30, at 91-98; Akehurst, supra note 21, at 12-15. For acts of
subordinate officials as possibly creating custom, Cf. Draft Restatement, § 102, Comment b at
25 (diplomatic acts and instructions, governmental measures or inaction).33Compare Draft Restatement No. 1, § 135, Comment b, at 66 with § 135 note 1, at 68.
4Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273
(1974-75). The Draft Restatement relies on this article for its conclusions on the authority of
customary international law. Draft Restatement No. 1 § 102 at 33.
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earlier law. Second, a specific law may prevail over a general provision.
Third, a superior law may prevail over a law having intrinsically less author-
ity. We must examine which of these methods of analysis may govern the
treaty-custom relationship.
A. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
Any analysis of the relationship between treaty and custom begins with
the definitions contained in the ICJ Statute." As previously noted, Article
38(1) of the ICJ Statute lists treaties as the first source of international law to
be consulted by the court. The committee draft of Article 38(1) provided
that the court must consult these sources "in successive order. '36 The
meaning of this phrase and the reasons for its subsequent deletion remain
unclear despite much discussion in legal scholarship?
From a very early period some jurists took the position that the Statute
established a hierarchy. A treaty would thus take precedence over an
international custom, whether that custom arose prior to, subsequent to, or
contemporaneously with the treaty rule.38 Some authorities state this posi-
tion as a rule of law, others as merely a rule of practice but one of such force
that a deviation from the order of Article 38(1) is virtually impossible.
Other jurists, however, hold that the Statute was not intended to state a
hierarchy, but only represents a listing of the sources of law in the self-
evident order in which a judge would consider them. These authors con-
clude that customary international law and treaty obligations are of equal
33This is not merely because this language has received some significant attention over the
years from international jurists. The Statute is appended to Article 92 of the United Nations
Charter, which further declares the Statute to be an integral part of the Charter, a multilateral
treaty to which the United States is a party. 59 Stat. 1031, 1051 and 1055, 1060. (June 26, 1945).
Therefore, if the language of the Statute does in fact create a hierarchy of treaty over custom,
such an interpretation would be binding upon the United States when it is before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
Permanent Court of International Justice-Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-
Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, Annex 1 at 730 (1920) (en ordre successif).37See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 34, at 274; SORENSON, LES SOURCES DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 237-38 (Copenhagen 1946); WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 96-98.31See, e.g., Fedozzi, Consultation "Pro Veritate," Publications de la Cour Permanente de
Justice Internationale Series C. No. 13-11, 386 (Leyden, 1927); Right of Passage Case, [1960]
I.C.J. REP. 6, 90 (Moreno, dissenting); H. LAUTERPACHT, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-87 (E.
Lauterpacht, ed. 1970) ("Treaties must be considered as ranking first in the hierarchical order
of the sources of international law." But cf, id., at 88); SORENSON, id., at 249-51 (judicial
treatment of Article 38 supports hierarchy); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 16
(London, 1949); WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 98-99 (Hierarchy of Article 38(1), while derived
from practical, not theoretical considerations, is in practice conclusive for a court). See also,
Scott and Carr, supra note 30, at 348. ("Most writers agree that the order of listing in the Statute
gives treaties a slight priority as a source of international law, with custom a close second.")
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authority.39 In any case, it is clear that although a majority of scholars favor
the position that Article 38(1) does not preclude the position that subse-
quent international customary law may override a prior treaty obligation,
there remains an important division of opinion on this subject'
The opinions of the scholars of international law are not in themselves a
source, but only evidence of international law.4' To determine whether the
Draft Restatement's view of customary international law is itself interna-
tional law we must look to treaties, customary international law, and the
other sources set forth in Article 38(1). We will not, however, discuss
general principles of law under Article 38(1), since no one rule of reconciling
conflicts between laws has gained acceptance in a national legal system. A
combination of methods is employed depending on the nature of the laws in
question.
B. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties42 does not resolve the
treaty-custom question. Article 38 of the International Law Commission's
1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, however, did address the
treaty-custom conflict:
A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions
4 3
This was deleted by a majority vote of the participants at the conference
which approved the final treaty text. A majority of the states which spoke in
favor of deletion felt this Section was undesirable, and many felt it was in
violation of international law. The present text of the Vienna Convention
does not, therefore, provide for the termination or amendment of treaty
provision by practice or by a new rule of customary international law.4
39See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 34, at 275; Heilborn, Les Sources du Droit International, 11
RECUEIL DES COURs 5, 29 (1926); Strupp, Les Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix, 47 RECUEIL
DES COURS 263,330 (1934); Capolari, L'Extinction et la Suspension des Traites, 134 RECUEIL DES
COURs 427, 516 (1971); Cheng, On the Nature and Sources of International Law in CHENG, ed.,
supra note 4, at 231-32. (But "operational hierarchy" corresponding to Article 38 may also
exist). See also (VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-53 (Deventer
1983).
4OSee Gamble, supra note 18, at 307 n.6; Schrader, Custom and General Principles as Sources
of International Law in American Federal Courts, 82 COL. L. REV. 751, 754-55 n.25 (1982)
(order of listing of sources in ICJ Statute suggests hierarchy, but point is disputed).4
'Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute defines the opinion of scholars as a subsidiary means of
determining rules of international law, which have other sources. See Schrader, id., at 755 n.25;
Scott and Carr, supra note 30, at 350-51.41U N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 81. L.M. 679 (1969). The Convention
was intended as a codification of the customary international law of treaties. The United States
has not yet ratified it.
43S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION 247 (Leyden 1970).
'Akehurst, supra note 34, at 377.
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The logic of Articles 56 and 64 of the Vienna Convention dealing with jus
cogens reinforces an interpretation of the Convention which views it as
rejecting the position adopted by the Draft Restatement. Jus cogens is a
recent concept designating those norms of international law having preemp-
tory character, i.e., which cannot be modified or abolished by treaty. If a
new rule of jus cogens arises in customary international law any treaty
obligations to the contrary are overriden. Today this concept has little
meaning or reality. First, no one knows what a rule of jus cogens is. Second,
whether rules ofjus cogens can be replaced or modified at all, or by new rules
of jus cogens remains uncertain. Thus, the exact scope of jus cogens as a
modifier of prior treaty obligations is subject to even more uncertainty than
modification by subsequent rules of international law. 5
The Vienna Convention's treatment of jus cogens, however, does seem to
indicate that a new rule of customary international law would not otherwise
override prior treaty obligations. If this were not so, why was it then
necessary to specifically provide that jus cogens customary rules override
prior treaty obligations?
The Vienna Convention, even if not yet ratified by the United States, is
usually regarded as declaratory of existing customary international law on
the interpretation of treaties. It provides no direct support for the Draft
Restatement's position on customary international law. Moreover, it
strongly indicates that present customary international law also does not
support the Draft Restatement's position.
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law itself contains no rule regarding a hierarchy
of sources. No authority-except possibly the Draft Restatement-states
that subsequent customary international law takes precedence over prior
treaty law by virtue of a rule of customary international law. Akehurst
asserts that a rule of customary international law corresponding to the
position of Section 102 may arise in the future; but this certainly suggests
that such a rule is not part of customary international law now.46
D. DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Judicial and arbitral decisions applying international law are, at least in
theory, not independent sources of international law, but only evidence
thereof. These decisions provide almost no support for the proposition that
45Cf. Draft Restatement § 339, Comment a, at 163-64; D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
244-45 (2d ed. 1970).
'Akehurst, supra note 34, at 277. Akehurst here seems to acknowledge that the Vienna




a new rule of customary international law may supersede a prior treaty
obligation. Several decisions have, however, arguably held that subsequent
practice between the parties to a treaty may modify or even supersede the
treaty.
In 1861 the Senate of the free city of Hamburg, deciding an arbitration
case, ruled that a treaty could be modified by subsequent conduct between
the parties 7 The decision required, however, express antecedent actions by
the party against whom the treaty was invoked to show that the parties in
effect had substituted a custom for a treaty. 8
A more recent and important decision is the Air Transport Services
Agreement Arbitration of 1963.!9 At issue was the interpretation of a treaty
between France and the United States which regulated flights originating in
the United States which stopped in France and then continued to third
countries. Following the conclusion of the treaty, lower French officials had
permitted American airlines to operate routes other than those assigned to
them in the treaty. The arbitration involved the validity of those routes. The
arbitration tribunal ruled that the practice of France-as performed by
subordinate officials-was not only relevant to the interpretation of the
treaty but also might indicate a modification of its terms by the practice of
the parties. Since the decision upheld the American right to the new routes,
the tribunal decided that such a modification had indeed occurred.
Neither of these decisions states that new international customary law
may override a prior treaty obligation. Rather, they hold that the subse-
quent conduct of the parties may not only be relevant to the interpretation of
a treaty, but also may modify the provisions of the treaty. This rule is far
narrower than the Draft Restatement's position. Subsequent conduct which
may modify a treaty is limited to practice between the parties to the treaty.
New custom, in contrast, may arise from the acts or even the declarations of
states or organizations not necessarily a party to the treaty.
In contrast, earlier cases have held a treaty to have superseded prior
international customary law. Some authorities cite these to support a hierar-
chical superiority of treaties over custom, but others note that the decisions
could rest on other grounds, such as the greater specificity or subsequent
ratification of the treaty5
E. OPINIONS OF JURISTS
The only real source, then, for the Draft Restatement is the opinions of
international legal scholars. These are not in themselves a source of interna-
47Affaire Yuille, Shortridge et Cie (October 21, 1861), LAPRADELLE and POLrIs, 2 RECUEIL DES
ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 78 (1923).
'See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 266.
49Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, 38 I.L.R. 182, 249, 253 (1969).
'E.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 38, at 16, and Akehurst, supra note 34, at 274-75.
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tional law, but are only evidence thereof.5 On the question of the possible
primacy of subsequent customary law over treaties, there is no unity.
1. Supporting Section 102
The arguments supporting Section 102 may be reduced to a single logical
proposition. Customary international law and treaties are universally ac-
knowledged as having equal obligatory force. Therefore, using generally
valid principles of interpretation, a custom later in time should govern over
an earlier treaty. This conclusion has undeniable logical simplicity. It natur-
ally appeals, moreover, to a minority of scholars who argue for the primacy
of custom over treaty obligations 2 To determine whether Section 102 is
valid, however, its usefulness and applicability, as well as logical proofs,
should be examined.
2. Arguments Supporting the Primacy of
Treaty Obligations
a. Conflict with Prior United States Precedent
The strongest argument against the Draft Restatement's position is its
evident conflict with United States precedent on the sources of international
law. The Paquete Habana53 held that to ascertain a rule of international law
"where there is no treaty, and no controlling legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and uses of civilized na-
tions. . .. "I' The Supreme Court further emphasized that the rule of
international law applied in that case was binding upon courts "in the
absence of any treaty or public act of their own government in relation to the
matter."55 The Supreme Court thereby clearly established that treaties
entered into by the United States have absolute priority over conflicting
rules of customary international law. Moreover, this priority derives from
the nature of the sources, not from their relationship in time, and applies
regardless of whether the customary rule of international law arises prior or
subsequent to the treaty or law5 6
Subsequent decisions have emphasized the continuing validity of The
"
tArticle 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 11.
5 E.g., De Visscher, Cours General du Droit International Public, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 1,
79 (1972); see also Gamble, supra note 18, at 313-15.
53175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900).
1Id. at 700.
551d. at 708.
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 373 F. Supp. 1161, 1178
(E.D. Pa. 1980). The court there, citing The Paquete Habana, stated that "international law
must give way when it conflicts with or is superseded by a federal statute or treaty" (emphasis
added). This seems to answer the query of Professor Henkin who interpreted prior precedent as
having left unresolved whether a subsequent custom overrides a prior treaty. Henkin, supra
note 5, at 221.
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Paquete Habana. Indeed, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in endorsing the descrip-
tion of sources set forth in The Paquete Habana, viewed Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute as having confirmed the approach of the Supreme Court.57 At least
one court thus seems to have acknowledged that both The Paquete Habana
and Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute establish a hierarchy of sources and that
both state a similar rule-namely, the priority of treaties over custom. The
Draft Restatement's position on the relationship of custom and treaty seems
difficult to reconcile with this precedent.
b. Opinio Juris
To supersede a prior treaty obligation, a custom must possess all the
elements of customary international law. But how can a state act in the belief
that its actions are mandated by international law when it violates the
express provisions of a treaty it has entered into with another party? Obser-
vance of treaties is mandated by the most ancient and fundamental principle
of international customary law, pacta sunt servanda (obligations entered
into must be fulfilled). It is difficult to imagine how a state could become
subject to a new international customary law when its protest against the
rule is already manifested in a provision of an earlier treaty diverging from
the later practice allegedly evidencing the new rule." A treaty is a much
clearer and more carefully considered statement of a state's "beliefs" or
"convictions" on the legality of a particular act than any other source.
Therefore, the difficulty of showing opinio juris when a state acts in con-
travention of an earlier agreement (absent express agreement by all other
parties) may be fatal to any attempt to establish a new rule of customary
international law in derogation of the prior treaty.
c. Evidence
The argument is quite old that treaties invariably take precedence over
custom simply by virtue of far greater ease of proof and certitude. Given the
amorphous nature of customary international law, at least under present
theories, it would be almost impossible to discern at any one moment what
customary international law is. This contrasts with the relative ease of
determination of treaty terms. According to this reasoning (even if the
hierarchical superiority of treaty over custom is only an evidentiary rule),
the need for certainty, in effect, transforms this relationship into a binding
51630 F.2d 876, 880-81 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., supra note 56, 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178; Centre for Independence of Judges v.
Mabey, 19 Bank. R. 635, 646-47 (D. Utah 1982) (court's analysis indicates priority of treaty
over custom); and the summary of 38 C.J.S. INT'L LAW, sec. 4 at 7-8.
5 8The United States has consistently taken the position that a treaty may only be modified by
processes agreed upon by the parties to the treaty. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES, 1516 (2d ed. 1945).
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hierarchy. Thus, for reasons of legal clarity, it would seem that an existing
treaty should take precedence over subsequent customary international
law."
d. Stability
This consideration is closely related to that immediately preceding, but
addresses issues of internal and external judicial order, rather than prob-
lems of application. The effect on the international political order of the
adoption of the theory set out in Section 102 may be profoundly disruptive.
Parties to a treaty could avoid their obligations by alleging abolition or
modification by new rules of customary international law derived from
United Nations resolutions, isolated acts of lower officials or of parties not
signatories to the treaty, or other questionable sources of new customary
international law.
The use by United States courts of such a doctrine is also a disturbing
possibility. It would be very unwise to permit private litigants or possibly
even foreign governments to litigate interpretations of treaties allegedly
modified or even abolished through practice, e.g., in the tax field.,
e. The "Lower Official" Problem
Once the Pandora's box of customary international law is opened, other
disturbing consequences become apparent. If state practice can be contrib-
uted to by any person, it might become possible in the United States for
subordinate officials to in effect overturn the decision of the president and
the Senate in ratifying a treaty. Air Transport Services Agreement Arbi-
tration6' raised this problem and the discussions leading to the Vienna
Convention indicate that this was a decisive reason for refusing to recognize
a section authorizing modification of treaties by international practice.
59See WOLFKE, supra note 20, at 98-99; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 86-87.
wFhis situation may indeed already exist in the area of international human rights. At
Schrader, supra note 40, 82 COL. L. REV. 751, 762-68, the author outlines disturbing trends
regarding the determination and application of customary international law in United States
federal courts.
These recent cases have often failed to search for or to examine rigorously evidence of
actual state practice, relying instead on treaties not directly binding upon the litigants or their
home countries as primary evidence of customary international law. Id. at 762.
The author warns that:
A recent willingness on the part of certain federal courts to find international custom in
resolutions and declarations of multilateral bodies, even in the absence of either actual
practice or opinio juris, combined with a tendency to view natural law as the ultimate source
of international rules, presages an era in which American courts take the lead in defining new
rules of international law. Such a development would reverse the traditional and well-
founded judicial reluctance to interfere with foreign relations and violate the accepted
methodological principles of international law.
Id. at 783.
61Supra note 49, at 249, 253.
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f. Hierarchy of Sources and
Hierarchy of Authority
Akehurst points out that the established hierarchy of sources in domestic
law corresponds to a hierarchy of authority.62 In the international area,
however, the same authority, the state, is the source of both treaty and
customary law, while the precise rank of authority of international organiza-
tions is unclear. Akehurst and other authors have, therefore, concluded that
no hierarchy of treaty over customary international law is possible. Still, all
is not that simple. For example, in domestic law one authority may issue
"laws" and "orders" of differing authority. The president (executive) enters
into both treaties and executive agreements, which are not ranked in order
of appearance. Similarly, a court issues not only decisions on both facts and
law but also a wide variety of orders. The United States Internal Revenue
Service issues both public and private rulings, having different authority. In
short, determining that the same authority is responsible for both treaty and
custom does not end the inquiry of whether one source is superior to
another. The position is perfectly acceptable that different sources of law
issued by the same authority may have a different priority in application by
reason of the conditions laid down by the issuing authority.
g. Modification of Treaties
The question of whether a treaty may be modified or rendered obsolete by
subsequent practice of the parties is conceptually distinct from modification
or termination by subsequent customary international law. As we have
seen, there is very little support for the former pFoposition and virtually
none outside of legal scholarship for the latter. Since earlier legal theory
required a much more general and lengthy practice to establish customary
international law, it is understandable that modification by practice and by
customary international law would merge.63
The crucial distinction is that modification or termination of a treaty
through subsequent practice may be effected only by the parties to the
treaty. A new rule of international law, however, may in contemporary
theory arise by acts of states, individuals or organizations not parties to the
treaty affected.
Authorities supporting the priority of subsequent customary interna-
tional law over prior treaties use a very restrictive definition of customary
international law. Akehurst states that even if a rule of customary interna-
tional law is established by other states, only the practice followed by the
parties to a treaty is relevant in determining whether a treaty has been
superseded. The evidence must be extremely clear and convincing to show
62Akehurst, supra note 34, at 273.
63E.g., id., at 276-77.
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termination or modification of a treaty by practice or custom. Affirmative,
abundant and consistent practice by the parties will be required.'
The Draft Restatement does not adequately reflect these serious qual-
ifications which scholars basically supporting its position have imposed on
customary international law. Rather, in Sections 102 and 135 it makes
sweeping statements, apparently permitting all international customary law
to supersede prior treaty obligations regardless of the actual practice of the
parties to the treaty. True, Comment b and Note 4 to Section 102 permit the
parties to maintain a treaty even in the face of new customary international
law. That transfers, however, the burden to the treaty parties to show
inapplicability of the new rule.
Moreover, the Draft Restatement adopts a contradictory position by
excluding the possibility of modification or amendment of a treaty by
subsequent practice of the parties in accord with the final teXt of the Vienna
Convention. Section 343 of the Draft Restatement 6 provides only for mod-
ification of a treaty by express agreement of the parties, and Note 1 thereto'M
admits the strong United States opposition to modification by subsequent
practice. The Draft Restatement thus seems to sanction the paradoxical
result that while the parties to a treaty may not amend or terminate it solely
by their affirmative subsequent practice, the practice of other states and
organizations not parties to the treaty may terminate or amend that treaty if
the parties do not expressly agree to maintain it.
V. Conclusion
The position of Section 102 on treaties and customary international law
may be attractive from a logical standpoint. The Draft Restatement posi-
tion, however, finds no direct support in treaty law, international customary
law or judicial decisions, and the opinions of international legal scholars on
that position are divided. Moreover, against its adoption are a whole group
of arguments that demonstrate the uncertainties the application of Section
102 will cause. These should be addressed and satisfactorily answered if such
a proposition is to be acceptable. Since that burden has not yet been met, the
ALl should consider the reordering of Section 102 and the revision of the
comments to that Section and Section 135.
6Akehurst, supra note 34, at 276.65Draft Restatement, § 343, at 173-74.
Id. note 1, at 175.
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